In a recent judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh [Jitender Kumar vs. Presiding Officer of Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal], the Hon’ble High Court has held that a mere assertion in a termination order to the effect that the work of the Employee was not found to be satisfactory, is not stigmatic in itself and the same cannot be challenged on the ground that no enquiry was conducted by the Management prior to removing the employee.
In the words of the Hon’ble Court:
“Before considering the facts of the case before us one further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking when a probationers appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationers appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job.”
The judgment in Parmanand v. Nagar Palika, Dehradun & others, (2003) 9 SCC 290 referred to by counsel for the petitioner, was not applicable as in the said case, the Apex Court, while examining the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the sole witness of the employer itself admitted that there was nothing to show that the service of the appellant was in any way unsatisfactory. Similar was the observation in Syed Azam Hussaini v. Andhra Bank Ltd.,1995 Supp (1) SCC 557 in which the Apex Court held that in the absence of any material to show reasonable cause to terminate the services of the appellant, the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in upsetting the finding recorded by the authorities and the Labour Court. The judgment in Mohindergarh Central Co-op. Bank Ltd. Mohindergarh v. State of Haryana & others, 2004 (1) RSJ 758 is also of no help to the petitioner on the ground that in the said case the workman was appointed on 25.08.1977 and his services were terminated on 21.03.1979. The plea of the bank that he had been appointed on probation was rejected on the ground that it was an ad hoc appointment. Once he had completed 240 days, reinstatement was ordered and the said order was upheld by this Court.
In Oswal Pressure Die Casting Industry, Faridabad v. Presiding Officer & another (1998) 3 SCC 225 the workman who was on probation, his services were terminated and the Labour Court held that the termination order was bad and ordered reinstatement with full back-wages on the ground that it was not an order of discharge simpliciter and it was necessary to hold domestic enquiry before passing such an order. The Management challenged the order before the High Court which upheld the order of the Labour Court. The Apex Court while examining the evidence, came to the conclusion that 2 witnesses had been examined by the Management to prove that the work was not satisfactory and thus, there was enough evidence to show that the work was unsatisfactory and accordingly, set aside the order of reinstatement.
Similarly, in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & others,(1999) 3 SCC 60, the Apex Court set aside the termination on the ground that it was not a simple order of termination but a lengthy order and it was a stigmatic order. It was held that the stigma need not be contained in the order of termination but the contents might be referred to in the termination orders or its annexures. Such a document could be asked for by the future employer of the probationer and thus, such a termination would be vitiated on the ground that no regular enquiry was conducted. The facts in the present case do not show that there was any such additional document along with the discharge order.
Merely because the respondent-Company had offered compensation as a matter of abundant caution, would not mean that the provisions of Section 25F would be attracted.
