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In a recent judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India viz. Santhini vs. Vijaya Venkatesh, the Apex Court, by a majority of 2:1, has held that videoconferencing cannot be permitted in Transfer Petitions. The Majority view propounded by The CJI Justice Deepak Mishra and Justice Khanwalikar is as follows:

1. In view of the scheme of the 1984 Act and in particular Section 11, the hearing of matrimonial disputes may have to be conducted in camera.
2. After the settlement fails and when a joint application is filed or both the parties file their respective consent memorandum for hearing of the case through videoconferencing before the concerned Family Court, it may exercise the discretion to allow the said prayer.
3. After the settlement fails, if the Family Court feels it appropriate having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that videoconferencing will sub-serve the cause of justice, it may so direct.
4. In a transfer petition, video conferencing cannot be directed.
5. The above directions shall apply prospectively.
6. The decision in Krishna Veni Nagam (supra) is overruled to the aforesaid extent.

On the contrary, the minority view, which advocates use of videoconferencing at practically every stage is as follows:

1. The Family Courts Act, 1984 has been enacted at a point in time when modern technology (at least as we know it today) which enables persons separated by spatial distances to communicate with each other face to face was not the order of the day or, in any case, was not as fully developed. That is no reason for any court-especially for this Court which sets precedent for the nation-to exclude the application of technology to facilitate the judicial process.
2. Appropriate deployment of technology facilitates access to justice. Litigation under the Family Courts Act 1984 is not an exception to this principle. This Court must be averse to judicially laying down a restraint on such use of technology which facilitates access to justice to persons in conflict, including those involved in conflicts within the family. Modern technology is above all a facilitator, enabler and leveler.
3. Video conferencing is a technology which allows users in different locations to hold face to face meetings. Video conferencing is being used extensively the world over (India being no exception) in on line teaching, administration, meetings, negotiation, mediation and telemedicine among a myriad other uses. Video conferencing reduces cost, time, carbon footprint and the like.
4. An in-camera trial is contemplated Under Section 11 in two situations: the first where the Family Court so desires; and the second if either of the parties so desires. There is a fallacy in the hypothesis that an in-camera trial is inconsistent with the usage of video conferencing techniques. A trial in-camera postulates the exclusion of the public from the courtroom and allows for restraints on public reporting. Video conferencing does not have to be recorded nor is it accessible to the press or the public. The proper adoption of video conferencing does not negate the postulates of an in-camera trial even if such a trial is required by the court or by one of the parties Under Section 11.
5. The Family Courts Act 1984 envisages an active role for the Family Court to foster settlements. Under the provisions of Section 11, the Family Court has to endeavour to “assist and persuade” parties to arrive at a settlement. Section 9 clearly recognises a discretion in the Family Court to determine how to structure the process. It does so by adopting the words “where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case”. Moreover, the High Courts can frame Rules Under Section 9(1) and the Family Court may, subject to those rules, “follow such procedure as it deems fit”. In the process of settlement, Section 10(3) enables the Family Court to lay down its own procedure. The Family Court is entitled to take the benefit of counsellors, medical experts and persons professionally engaged in promoting the welfare of the family.
6. The above provisions-far from excluding the use of video conferencing-are sufficiently enabling to allow the Family Court to utilise technological advances to facilitate the purpose of achieving justice in resolving family conflicts. There may arise a variety of situations where in today’s age and time parties are unable to come face to face for counselling or can do so only at such expense, delay or hardship which will defeat justice. One or both spouses may face genuine difficulties arising from the compulsions of employment, family circumstances (including the needs of young children), disability and social or economic handicaps in accessing a court situated in a location distant from where either or both parties reside or work. It would be inappropriate to deprive the Family Court which is vested with such wide powers and procedural flexibility to adopt video conferencing as a facilitative tool, where it is convenient and readily available. Whether video conferencing should be allowed must be determined on a case to case analysis to best effectuate the concern of providing just solutions. Far from such a procedure being excluded by the law, it will sub serve the purpose of the law.
7. Conceivably there may be situations where parties (or one of the spouses) do not want to be in the same room as the other. This is especially true when there are serious allegations of marital abuse. Video conferencing allows things to be resolved from the safety of a place which is not accessible to the other spouse against whom there is a serious allegation of misbehaviour of a psychiatric nature or in a case of substance abuse.
8. Video conferencing is gender neutral. In fact it ensures that one of the spouses cannot procrastinate and delay the conclusion of the trial. Delay, it must be remembered, generally defeats the cause of a party which is not the dominant partner in a relationship. Asymmetries of power have a profound consequence in marital ties. Imposing an unwavering requirement of personal and physical presence (and exclusion of facilitative technological tools such as video conferencing) will result in a denial of justice.
9. The High Courts have allowed for video conferencing in resolving family conflicts. A body of precedent has grown around the subject in the Indian context. The judges of the High Court should have a keen sense of awareness of prevailing social reality in their states and of the federal structure. Video conferencing has been adopted internationally in resolving conflicts within the family. There is a robust body of authoritative opinion on the subject which supports video conferencing, of course with adequate safeguards. Whether video conferencing should be allowed in a particular family dispute before the Family Court, the stage at which it should be allowed and the safeguards which should be followed should best be left to the High Courts while framing Rules on the subject. Subject to such rules, the use of video conferencing must be left to the careful exercise of discretion of the Family Court in each case.
10. The proposition that video conferencing can be permitted only after the conclusion of settlement proceedings (resultantly excluding it in the settlement process), and thereafter only when both parties agree to it does not accord either with the purpose or the provisions of the Family Courts Act 1984. Exclusion of video conferencing in the settlement process is not mandated either expressly or by necessary implication by the legislation. On the contrary the legislation has enabling provisions which are sufficiently broad to allow video conferencing. Confining it to the stage after the settlement process and in a situation where both parties have agreed will seriously impede access to justice. It will render the Family Court helpless to deal with human situations which merit flexible solutions. Worse still, it will enable one spouse to cause interminable delays thereby defeating the purpose for which a specialised court has been set up.